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Abstract
The impact of the constitutional dilemma created by the ABA’s aversion to
Internet schooling is widespread. Currently, 18 states and 2 U.S. territories restrict bar
exam eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools. Additionally, 29 states and
1 U.S. territory restrict admission to practice on motion to graduates of ABA-accredited
law schools.
Although numerous lawsuits have been filed in ultimately failed efforts to strike
down bar admission rules that restrict eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools, none has challenged the ABA-accreditation requirement based on the First
Amendment’s prohibition on media discrimination. This Article makes that case.
Despite accelerating technological advances, the ABA still refuses to accredit
online JD programs and Internet law school. But states that restrict bar eligibility to
graduates of ABA-accredited law schools not only punish graduates of online JD
programs for daring to have engaged in online educational communication, they
necessarily devalue educational communication and association over the Internet. This,
in turn, predictably diminishes the amount of protected Internet speech and association in
favor of traditional face-to-face communication and association.
Such media discrimination is vulnerable to First Amendment attack under theories
that seek to protect liberty of circulation, academic freedom and access to the legal
profession. Accordingly, states should meet their constitutional obligations and furnish
graduates of online JD programs with an alternative pathway to licensure.
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Surfing Past the Pall of Orthodoxy: Why the First Amendment Virtually Guarantees
Online Law School Graduates Will Breach the ABA Accreditation Barrier
By Nick Dranias1
Introduction
Despite accelerating technological advances, the ABA still refuses to accredit
online JD programs and Internet law schools.2 This refusal punishes people for choosing
an online education and excludes marginalized populations from pursuing a legal career.3
When enforced by state laws that restrict bar admission eligibility to graduates of ABAaccredited law schools, this means that competent lawyers and law students are barred
from practicing law for no other reason than their choice of educational medium, and
online legal education is necessarily devalued and diminished. Such media
discrimination violates the First Amendment and creates a serious constitutional dilemma
for those states that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited schools.
The impact of the constitutional dilemma created by the ABA’s aversion to
Internet schooling is widespread. Currently, 18 states and 2 U.S. territories—including
such states as Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and New Jersey—restrict bar exam
eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools.4 Additionally, 29 states and 1
U.S. territory restrict admission to practice on motion (without requiring an exam) to
graduates of ABA-accredited law schools.5 Moreover, many of these restrictions are
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absolute, with state supreme courts expressly or implicitly refusing to recognize a waiver
process for bar applicants.6
Although numerous lawsuits have been filed in ultimately failed efforts to strike
down bar admission rules that restrict eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools,7 none has challenged the ABA-accreditation requirement based on the First
Amendment’s prohibition on media discrimination.8 This Article makes that case.9
Part 1 of this Article explains why the Internet is at least as robust an educational
medium as face-to-face communication.10 Part 2 explains how the ABA’s standards on
accreditation—even considering the ABA’s variance procedure—presumptively prohibit
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online JD programs and schools.11 Part 3 contends that such prejudice constitutes
unconstitutional media discrimination that interferes with liberty of circulation and
academic freedom.12 Part 4 rebuts anticipated state action defenses to the proposed
media discrimination theory.13 Part 5 discusses how a recent decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which applied heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment
to bar admission rules, supports the theory that states cannot absolutely bar graduates of
online JD programs from practicing law without violating the First Amendment.14
In short, this Article will explain why states that absolutely restrict bar eligibility
to graduates of ABA-accredited schools should anticipate lawsuits charging them with a
constitutionally unjustifiable prejudice against the Internet as an educational medium.
Part 1: The Internet is now at least as robust an educational medium as face-toface communication.
“The breakneck pace of growth in Internet-based distance learning” should not be
too surprising.15 The Internet enables 24-7 educational communication that crosses
hundreds and even thousands of miles—allowing students who would otherwise have no
such opportunity to learn from the best professors in the nation.16 Such accessibility taps
vast reservoirs of unmet demand in marginalized populations—minorities, the poor, the
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disabled, the remote, and those who face responsibilities that make traditional day or
night school impossible.17
The accelerating growth rate of online schooling also reflects recognition of the
increasingly robust nature of Internet information technologies at delivering educational
content. Online schools have the capacity to broadcast lectures combined with liveblogging, chat rooms or bulletin boards.18 Recently, a virtual classroom in which
students could interact with each other and professors through “avatars”—graphical
representations of themselves—was deployed for a lecture program at Harvard Law
School.19 In the near future, educators foresee the use of existing software that presently

17

Kevin Deutsch, Online Degree At Nova Helps Mom Achieve Her Goal, MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 2003, at
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inactive or shy students become active during online discussions).
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School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 841, 851-67 (2000) (discussing technologies used at
Concord’s online law school); Boser, supra note 16 at 60; Schott, supra note 17 at 14; Weekend All Things
Considered: Country’s First Online Law School (NPR radio broadcast November 14, 2002) (reporting
“within two sessions you become so familiar with the process and it goes so smoothly you feel you’re in a
classroom, you feel you’re interacting with the other students, and you feel the teacher is interacting with
you”).
19
Wagner James Au, Everything Goes Better With Daleks, NEW WORLD NOTES, May 16, 2006,
http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2006/05/everything_goes.html (reporting a talk at Harvard Law School hosted
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Talking Heads for Tele-education Applications 8 (Digital Signal Proc. Lab, Depart. of Informatics [sic]
Systems & Telecomm., U. Genova, June 15, 2001), available at
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term, we can imagine the creation of a 3D virtual classroom where not only the tutor is represented by an
avatar, but also other students that are accessing the system at the same time. The awareness of the virtual
presence of other classmates would improve the didactic interaction between the students, and give the
possibility to do more complex exercises”).
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allows for massively multiplayer gaming in such a way that students could learn through
simulated experiments and interaction with historical figures and settings in virtual
reality—possibly even legal questioning from a virtual Socrates himself.20 With
advances like these, and still more in the pipeline,21 there is little doubt the Internet is a
vastly more promising educational medium than correspondence, closed-circuit
television, and, perhaps, even face-to-face communication.
In fact, there is a mounting collection of academic studies that shows the
educational success of modern Internet schooling equals or exceeds that of “bricks and
mortar” schooling.22 Moreover, the California State Board of Bar Examiners has long
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Two Student Populations, J.C. SCI. TEACHING, Feb. 2002, at 312-317 (reporting no significant difference
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Online Students Perform as Well as Lecture Students?, J. ENGINEERING EDUC., Jan. 2001, at 131-136
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students”); M.O. Thirunarayanan & Aixa Perez-Prad, Comparing Web-based and Classroom-based
Learning: A Quantitative Study, J. RES. COMPUTING EDUC., Winter 2001-2002, at 131-137 (reporting
"while the online group scored slightly better that the campus group on the class posttest, the difference in
performance was not statistically significant”); M. Hosein Fallah & Robert Ubell, Blind Scores in a
Graduate Test: Conventional Compared with Web-based Outcomes, ALN MAG., December 2000; Peter
Navarro & Judy Shoemaker, Economics in Cyberspace: A Comparison Study (U. Cal.-Irvine, Graduate
Sch. Mgmt., Discussion Paper, 1999), at 17 (reporting from a study of several hundred undergraduate
macroeconomics students that “[t]he results strongly suggest that Cyberlearners can learn as well or better
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permitted graduates of online schools to sit for its bar exam,23 which is known as one of
the most difficult exams in the country.24 Even the ABA accredits online programs in
paralegal studies and health law;25 and it also recently allowed law schools such as
Cornell to coordinate with other law schools in offering limited online courses in
copyright and social security law.26 These facts justify close scrutiny of the classification
of online law schooling as just another form of highly restricted correspondence-style
“distance learning” under the ABA’s law school accreditation standards.

than Traditional Learners regardless of entering characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, academic
background, computer skills, or academic aptitude and do so with a high degree of ‘customer
satisfaction’”); Robert LaRose, Jennifer Gregg & Matt Eastin, Audiographic Telecourses for the Web: An
Experiment Telecommunication, JCMC 4 (2), December 1998 (observing “Analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) showed that the experimental group had test scores and student attitude and teacher
immediacy ratings equal to those of the control group after controlling for student gender, class level, grade
point average and attendance. Open-ended interviews were also conducted to assess qualitative dimensions
of student satisfaction. The results supported the audiographic telecourse model as a potentially costeffective approach to distributing courses over the Web”), available at
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol4/issue2/larose.html); see generally INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, supra note
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Examination Information and History 2 (undated), http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/admissions/Bar-ExamInfo-History.pdf (last visited October 17, 2006) (stating “[u]nlike most other states, California allows
graduates from a variety of different types of law schools to take the bar examination. Such schools include
those approved by the American Bar Association (ABA), schools accredited by the State Bar’s Committee
of Bar Examiners but not approved by the ABA, schools that are not approved by the ABA nor accredited
by the Committee of Bar Examiners and correspondence law schools, which includes distance learning and
online law schools”).
24
James Bandler, Raising The Bar: Even Top Lawyers Fail California Exam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2005, §
A, at 1 (reporting California bar exam has a 56% failure rate, far higher than national average of 36%);
Highest Pass Rate Since 1965 For February's State Bar Exam, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 28, 1992, at
A20 (reporting California bar exam is one of the toughest in the country).
25
Tranette Ledford, Paralegals Go Beyond Law Offices, DECISION TIMES, March 6, 2006, at 6; Deutsch,
supra note 17, at 1B; LEGAL ASSISTANT TODAY, supra note 19, at 29-33.
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Memorandum from Peter W. Martin to John A. Sebert, ABA Consultant on Legal Education, A Report
on the LII’s Two Multi-Law School Courses Conducted Via the Internet in 2000-2001, December 7, 2001,
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/distanceeducation/1ii.html.
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Part 2: The ABA’s accreditation standards facially discriminate against Internet
schooling.
Much has been made of the ABA’s recent decision to adopt diversity standards
for the accreditation of law schools at its August 2006 annual conference.27 Less noticed
were new interpretative statements suggesting that the ABA might consider variances
from its accreditation standards for “experimental programs.”28 Such rhetoric may or
may not be a step towards recognizing the reality of Internet-based education, but it is
clear that the ABA’s accreditation standards still facially discriminate against Internet
schooling by lumping it together with less robust forms of so-called “distance learning”
and restricting it even more than “study outside of the classroom.”
“Distance learning,” as defined by ABA Standard 306, has long been the category
in which the ABA placed online JD programs and Internet schooling—alongside
correspondence schooling and instruction by closed-circuit television.29 As such, the
ABA: 1) prohibits “distance learning” during the first year of law school;30 and 2)
restricts “distance learning” to no more than four hours per semester, up to a grand total
of twelve hours.31 Consequently, under normal circumstances, not even a single semester
of classes can be conducted entirely online if a school desires ABA accreditation.
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Matt Krupnick, Law Schools Must Increase Diversity, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, August 19, 2006, § Local,
at F4.
28
Memorandum from John A. Sebert, Consultant on Legal Education, to Deans of ABA Approved Law
Schools (December 19, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/commentsstandards2006/standardsmMarkup2,5,8.pdf (stating
“[t]he committee believes that there are two primary circumstances in which granting a variance might be
appropriate: the existence of extraordinary circumstances (e.g. Hurricane Katrina) that made it impossible
for a school to comply with specific standards, or a well-structured experimental program that among other
benefits, might provide useful evidence to consider in eventually making revisions of the standards”).
29
ABA 2005-06 STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard No. 306 (b) (2005).
30
Id. at (e).
31
Id. at (d).
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Significantly, the ABA’s standards restrict “distance learning” to fewer credit
hours than are permitted for what the ABA regards as “study outside of the classroom,”
such as internships and/or independent research—despite the fact that such “study” can
be totally non-interactive between instructor and student (or student and student).32 This
relative favoritism for “study outside of the classroom” exists despite the fact that “ample
interaction” is required between student and instructor for any form of “distance
learning.” Such favoritism proves that the justification for ABA’s restrictions on the use
of the Internet cannot be a lack of sufficient instructor-student interactivity—or even
social interaction in general.33
In short, on their face, the ABA’s accreditation standards facially bar JD degree
programs that are conducted fully or even substantially online regardless of whether the
school is otherwise able to meet the ABA’s library and office infrastructure, teacherstudent faculty ratios, interactivity or financial requirements. Such discrimination
against the Internet as a medium of educational communication is not overcome by the
possibility of petitioning for a “variance” under ABA accreditation standard 80234
because the exercise of such authority is entirely discretionary35 and the failure and
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“Study outside of the classroom” other than “distance learning” can consist of up to 13,000 instruction
minutes of the required 58,000 instruction minutes. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 29, at §§ 304, 305.
33
Even if Internet schooling were creatively combined with “study outside of the classroom,” no more than
a grand total of 31 credit hours could be earned in this manner (based on 700 minutes per credit hour) out
of a required 83 credit hours. This would restrict even the most creative Internet school to providing little
more than two semesters of off-site education—and, even then, only for second and third year students.
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 29, at §§ 304, 305, 306.
34
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 29, at § 802 (stating “[a] law school proposing to offer a program of legal
education a portion of which is inconsistent with a Standard may apply for a variance. If the Council finds
that the proposal is nevertheless consistent with the general purposes of the Standards, the Council may
grant the variance and shall impose the conditions and time limits it considers appropriate”).
35
Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. ABA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7033, at *50-51 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding
“[v]iewing the facts in the light most favorable to MSL, MSL not only declined to comply with the six
ABA Accreditation Standards quoted above, but in five of the areas -- all except Standard 301 -- MSL
failed to represent that it ever would comply. Standard 802 vests in the ABA Council the sole discretion of
determining whether a proposed variance is ‘consistent’ with ‘the purpose of the Standards.’ That MSL
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refusal to meet ABA standards is “prima facie” evidence justifying the denial of a
variance application.36 As there is little question that an online JD program would, at
minimum, violate ABA Standards 304, 305 and 306, the ABA would have complete
discretion to deny an online school’s application for a variance.37
Not surprisingly, the ABA has repeatedly stated that it has no plans to accredit
online JD programs.38 Although that stance may be softening, the ABA has not
disavowed it.39 And while changes to Standard 802 adopted at the August 2006 ABA
annual meeting suggest that the ABA might be willing to waive certain accreditation
restrictions on a case-by-case basis with respect to an appropriately qualified

refused to comply with many of the Standards now or in the near future seems at least prima facie evidence
that the proposals quoted above would prove to be inconsistent with the ‘purpose of the Standards.’ Given
the detailed Site Report by the Accreditation Committee, recitation of eleven areas under which MSL did
not comply with the Standards, and solicitation and review of MSL's proposed accommodations in the
context of MSL's appeal of the Accreditation Committee's decision to the Council and the House of
Delegates, I conclude that the evidence would not permit a reasonable juror to find that ABA did not
consider MSL's proposed variance in good faith or that the ABA denied accreditation in breach of its
agreement with MSL. The ABA's denial of a variance was thus based on substantial reasons which fell
within ABA's legitimate discretion”).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Dan Carnevale, Bar Association Seeks to Ease Rules on Distance Education for Law Schools, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., July 5, 2002, at 32 (reporting the following statement by Barry A. Currier, former deputy
consultant to the legal-education section of the ABA: “We're moving slowly—this [Standard 306] isn't
going to authorize any law school to have a juris-doctor program through distance education . . . It provides
a lot more flexibility than schools had.”); Liptak, supra note 22, at 34 (reporting “[t]he profession and other
law schools appear threatened by the whole concept, and the American Bar Association has declined to
consider an online law school for accreditation, which would be necessary for its students to take the bar in
any state except California. But California, which has long allowed correspondence school graduates to
take its exam, has reciprocity agreements that would let its lawyers practice in some other states. John A.
Sebert, a bar association official, says it has no plans to accredit a completely virtual law school, though it
has recently allowed traditional law schools to offer limited online courses. ‘We're training professionals
who deal with people as problem solvers who need skills of negotiation, counseling and advocacy,’ he said.
‘Most of us find it difficult to believe that that kind of training can be done solely in an online
atmosphere.’”).
39
The ABA website presently states “[c]urrently, there are not any law schools approved by the ABA that
provide a J.D. degree completely via correspondence study. In fact, the ABA’s general policy under
Standard 304(f) states that ‘a law school shall not grant credit for study by correspondence.’ However,
there are exceptions to the general rule.” See Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
Standard 306, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/distanceeducation/distance.html (last visited October 17,
2006) (emphasis added).
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“experimental program,”40 even a more-liberally-construed variance process is still a
variance process. As the ABA’s accreditation standards are currently structured, they
presumptively—and facially—discriminate against online educational communication for
no other reason than it occurs online.41
Part 3: By restricting access to the bar to graduates of ABA-accredited schools,
the State is discriminating against the Internet as a medium of educational
communication and interfering with liberty of circulation and academic freedom.
In view of the anti-online education bias of the ABA’s accreditation standards, an
admission rule that restricts bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools
reduces the amount of Internet speech and association in legal education by drying-up the
market for online schools and JD programs. It does so by barring graduates of online law
schools and JD programs from working in their chosen profession in a given jurisdiction,
which destroys a substantial part of the value of a JD degree. This, in turn, creates a
significant financial disincentive for would-be lawyers to participate in online JD
programs. Naturally, the reduction in market demand for online JD programs diminishes
the amount of Internet speech and association in legal education offered by both online
and “bricks-and-mortar” schools. Given that over a third of state jurisdictions restrict bar
eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools,42 the aggregate adverse effect of
these admission rules on Internet speech and association is undoubtedly substantial.
Such government-enforced prejudice against Internet legal education cannot be
sustained under the First Amendment. The time when the ability to practice law was

40

See supra note 28.
Cf. Donald J. Weidner, Thoughts On Academic Freedom: Urofsky And Beyond, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 257,
263 (2001) (observing “[t]he accreditation process . . . tends to discourage the use of distance learning
technologies”).
42
See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
41
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deemed a mere privilege ungoverned by constitutional considerations ended long ago.43
When a state enacts laws that discriminate against a particular medium of communication
in favor of other favored media, such laws generally run afoul of the First Amendment. 44
Moreover, the Internet is now widely recognized as an important medium, if not the “No.
1 media.”45 There is no exception from the First Amendment for laws that discriminate
against the Internet.46
In The Pitt News v. Pappert, for example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a law preventing certain advertisers from running paid—but not unpaid—ads in a
college newspaper was unconstitutional because “the Supreme Court recognized long ago
that laws that impose special financial burdens on the media or a narrow sector of the
media present a threat to the First Amendment.”47 And in ForSaleByOwner.com v.
Zinnemann, a federal district court held the State “cannot make arbitrary distinctions
based on the manner of speech or the media used for publication” and struck down an
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Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a constitutionally protected liberty and
property interest in pursuing a legal career and, more specifically, in sitting for the bar exam. See, e.g.,
Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (holding state cannot deny application
for bar admission without a due process hearing). And the Supreme Court has recognized the practice of
law as a protected privilege under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S.
546 (1989).
44
See generally City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (holding “[o]ur prior decisions have voiced
particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression. Thus, we have held invalid
ordinances that completely banned the distribution of pamphlets within the municipality, handbills on the
public streets, the door-to-door distribution of literature, and live entertainment. Although prohibitions
foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they
pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent -- by eliminating a common means of speaking, such
measures can suppress too much speech”) (citations omitted); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States,
42 F.3d 181, 203 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding “[w]hile the First Amendment may tolerate speech regulations
that ‘ban [a] particular manner or type of expression at a given time or place,’ it does not accommodate
regulations which ban completely a particular manner of expression”).
45
Candace Lombardi, Study: Web is the No. 1 Media, CNET NEWS.COM, June 5, 2006,
http://news.com.com/study+west+is+the+no.+1+media/2100-1024_3-6080280.html.
46
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (holding “our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium”).
47
The Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 102-03 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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effort by California to regulate the Internet differently than the print media with respect to
home sale advertisements.48 Based on this precedent, states face claims for media
discrimination when they enforce the ABA’s presumption against online law schooling.
Moreover, as discussed below, to successfully defend admission rules that restrict bar
eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, states need to overcome
heightened scrutiny. This is because media discrimination in a university setting
implicates First Amendment precedent that strongly protects “liberty of circulation” and
“academic freedom.”
A. The doctrine of liberty of circulation stands against absolutist admission rules
that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools.
Liberty of circulation doctrine requires courts to strictly scrutinize under the First
Amendment regulations that restrict highly effective means of circulating information
even if they are content-neutral and aimed at the secondary effects of the regulated
conduct.49 In Schneider v. State, for example, the Court struck down a licensing law for
handbill distribution. In doing so, the Court rejected “secondary effect” concerns about
reducing the amount of litter, stating “pamphlets have proved most effective instruments
in the dissemination of opinion.”50

48

ForSaleByOwner.com v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
See generally Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (holding “[t]his ordinance simply bars all
handbills under all circumstances anywhere that do not have the names and addresses printed on them in
the place the ordinance requires. There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend
to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. ‘Liberty of circulating is
as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would
be of little value.’”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf. Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (suggesting that content neutrality would not save law banning signage that required
use of less effective media); William E. Lee, Modernizing The Law Of Open--Air Speech: The Hughes
Court And The Birth Of Content-Neutral Balancing, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1219, 1250-51
(2005) (discussing how content neutrality did not save ordinances from heightened scrutiny under the
liberty of circulation doctrine).
50
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62, 163-64 (1939) (holding “[t]o require a censorship through
license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart
49
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Although the doctrine has been most often applied in situations involving print
media and prior restraints, it has also been extended to regulations that undermine free
speech across modern transmission media in more subtle ways. In Comcast Cablevision
v. Broward County, for example, the doctrine was recently invoked to strike down an
ordinance that gave equal-access to a portion of a cable company’s infrastructure to
competing Internet service providers as a condition of the company maintaining or
receiving a cable franchise.51 This “open-access” ordinance not only overrode the
editorial discretion of cable companies, it effectively subsidized competing media by
allowing ISPs to supplement their existing infrastructure with infrastructure that would
otherwise be unavailable to them.52
In defense of its regulatory scheme, the county government argued that the First
Amendment was not implicated because the ordinance constituted economic regulation of
a transmission facility that ensured more, rather than less, speech.53 The Honorable
Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks rejected this argument, observing:
Liberty of circulating is not confined to newspapers and periodicals,
pamphlets and leaflets, but also to delivery of information by means of
fiber optics, microprocessors and cable. . . . Under the First Amendment,
government should not interfere with the process by which preferences for
information evolve.54
The Court also held that, for information to circulate freely as intended under the First
Amendment, the marketplace of ideas must be protected from regulations that interfere
“with the ability of market participants to use different cost structures and economic

of the constitutional guarantees”) (emphasis added); see also Lovell v. City Of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938).
51
Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
52
The related ordinance was passed “at the prompting of GTE, a telephone company offering competing
services.” Id. at 687.
53
Id. at 691.
54
Id. at 696-97.
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approaches based upon the inherent advantages and disadvantages of their respective
technology.”55
A bar admission rule that discriminates against online JD programs creates
significant economic incentives that favor face-to-face educational communication over
online communication. In this way, like the open-access regulation in Comcast
Cablevision, such a rule dictates the structure of the educational marketplace of ideas
without regard to the inherent advantages or disadvantages of the respective media of
communication. This interference distorts the free flow of information that would
otherwise occur, thereby violating the doctrine of liberty of circulation as applied in
Comcast Cablevision. And such distortion has substantive consequences for educational
speech.
As paraphrased by Judge Middlebrooks in Comcast Cablevision, “to a substantial
extent, ‘the medium is the message.’”56 Put another way, substantial regulatory
interference with communication media ossifies the content of communication by
impeding the dissemination of ideas and thereby skewing the results of competition in the
marketplace of ideas in favor of the established orthodoxy. Likewise, educational
orthodoxy is reinforced by bar admission rules that diminish the diversity of educational
voices by exclusively recognizing the ABA’s “one size fits all”57 accreditation process.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that many scholars decry the stifling uniformity
and elitism of the curricular content of ABA-accredited law schools.58 For this reason,
55

Id. at 693.
Id. at 692 (citing MARSHALL MCLUAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSION OF MAN (McGrawHill 1964)).
57
Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND. L. REV. 23, 28
(2000).
58
See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association: Why the
“Solomon Amendment” Is Constitutional and Law Schools Aren't Expressive Associations, 14 WM. &
56
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the kind of strict scrutiny usually reserved for content-based speech regulation is
appropriate for regulations that substantially interfere with liberty of circulation,
including bar admission rules that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited
law schools.59 Such scrutiny is also triggered by the constitutional protection of
academic freedom.
B. The protection of academic freedom requires refraining from restricting bar
eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools.
It is well-established that free speech and association in an academic setting are
protected by the First Amendment.60 Indeed, the rhetoric used to emphasize the
importance of such “academic freedom” in the university setting is rarely matched
elsewhere. For example, in their concurrence to Wiemen v. Updegraff, Justices
Frankfurther and Douglas wrote:
To regard teachers—in our entire educational system, from the primary
grades to the university—as the priests of our democracy is therefore not
to indulge in hyperbole. . . . They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine,
qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring process of
extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the
freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States against infraction by National or
State government. The functions of educational institutions in our
national life and the conditions under which alone they can adequately
perform them are at the basis of these limitations upon State and National
power.61
MARY BILL RTS. J., 2005, 415, 419-23 (2005) (observing “[e]ven more astounding than the number of law
schools, however, is the remarkable lack of diversity of approaches among law schools”); Lawrence C.
Foster, The Impact of the Close Relationship Between American Law Schools and the Practicing Bar, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 346, 347 (2001) (observing “[t]he first-year curriculum is nearly identical at all American
law schools: legal writing and research, contract law, property law, criminal law, torts, and civil procedure,
with some law schools also introducing aspects of constitutional law. In the second and third year, most
courses are elective”).
59
Cf. Comcast Cablevision, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (holding “this case falls within the rule of Tornillo,
Minneapolis Star and TribuneCo., and Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. and therefore strict scrutiny is required”);
see also Dennis R. Williams & W. Thomas Fisher, The Role of Freedom of Speech in the "Open Access"
Debate, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 796, 808 (2001) (supporting strict scrutiny applied in Comcast Cablevision)
60
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-83, 196-97 (1972).
61
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952) (Frankfurther, Douglas, JJ., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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With similar flourish, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Court reiterated:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.’ The
classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection . . . . To impose
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation.62
Finally, in Shelton v. Tucker, the Court held “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.”63
In Healy v. James, these principles of law eventually led the Supreme Court to
require a public university to recognize Students for a Democratic Society as an official
student organization because the Court held withholding such a “stamp of approval” cast
“a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom” through “subtle governmental interference”
even though the university did not prohibit student members from speaking or meeting on
campus.64 It is impossible to square this holding, and the constitutional principles that led
to it, with a bar admission rule that stifles online education in favor of an orthodox
“bricks-and-mortar” education, especially in view of the strides that have been made in
recent years by Internet technology. Stifling the freedom to engage in online education
casts—and threatens to cast—a far greater “pall of orthodoxy over the classroom” than
the mere failure to give a student organization an official “stamp of approval.” And if
62

Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601, 603, 609-10 (1967) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
63
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
64
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-83; id. at 196-97 (Douglas, J. concurring) (declaring “[s]tudents as well as faculty
are entitled to credentials in their search for truth”).
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academic freedom should be aggressively protected under the First Amendment from
even “subtle governmental interference,” then such protection should extend to the use of
the Internet for educational communication and association. This conclusion is perhaps
best illustrated by way of a thought experiment.
It is the year 1466. Thirty years ago, Johannes Guttenberg invented the movabletype printing press. That invention is now resulting in an explosion of book publication.
Libraries of knowledge that were once restricted to monasteries, nobles and a handful of
universities are increasingly available to the masses. There is talk of a “Renaissance” of
classical philosophy and culture. Fearing for their job security, a collection of university
scholars and guild masters adopt educational standards that prohibit “book learning” in
favor of face-to-face lectures and handwritten scroll-reading. A number of German and
Italian principalities then decide to recognize exclusively the accreditation decisions of
this collection of scholars and guild masters. Entry into various occupations is then
restricted based upon whether the entrant has graduated from an accredited center of
learning.
Is there any doubt that this sort of ban on “book learning” would have imposed a
“straightjacket” upon Europe’s intellectual development? In view of the revolutionary
educational potential of Internet schooling, an admission rule that restricts bar eligibility
to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools undermines academic freedom because it
impedes intellectual development in the legal field. But can states be held
constitutionally responsible for discriminating against online speech and association
when such discrimination originates with the accreditation decisions of a private entity?
The short answer is yes.
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Part 4: States that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools are constitutionally responsible for the predictable diminishment in
protected Internet speech and association.
The bottom line is that the “decision to recognize” an “official accreditation
agency is undoubtedly state action . . . and must comply with the constitution.”65
Moreover, the exclusive recognition of only one accreditation agency clearly employs the
state’s coercive power. By extension, the state should be held constitutionally
responsible for media discrimination when it restricts bar eligibility to graduates of ABAaccredited law schools. Any other conclusion would lead to constitutional absurdity.
Imagine, for example, a private accreditation organization that ordinarily would
not accredit law schools that admitted African-Americans. A state that recognized such
an entity as its exclusive official accreditation agency would find itself in considerable
constitutional jeopardy. This is because it is “axiomatic that a state may not induce,
encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden
to accomplish.” 66 Likewise, a state should be held constitutionally responsible for media
discrimination when it promotes such discrimination by exclusively recognizing a private
accreditation agency that ordinarily engages in media discrimination. This contention is

65

Timothy Sandefur, Note, Dinosaur TRACS: The Approaching Conflict Between Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence and College Accreditation Procedures, 7 NEXUS J. OP. 79, 86 (2002) (relying on Medical
Institute of Minnesota v. NATTS, 817 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1987)).
66
This constitutional axiom was repeatedly enforced in cases where local governments tried to evade 14th
Amendment requirements (and sanctions for non-compliance with desegregation orders) by shifting
management and control over public facilities to private organizations that would then “independently”
maintain segregated facilities. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464 (1973) (citing Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 476 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (citing Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399
(1964); Lombard v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); NAACP v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958))); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726-727 (1961)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 305-307 (1965) (Justice White concurring); Hall
v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (ED La.1961), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515
(1962)); cf. Edmunson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 625 (1991) (observing rule “[i]f a
government confers on a private body the power to choose the government's employees or officials, the
private body will be bound by the constitutional mandate of race neutrality”).
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further supported by considering the Supreme Court’s holding in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona.67
In Bates, the Supreme Court struck down the Arizona State Bar’s adoption of the
ABA’s ethical rules against lawyer advertising and solicitation “in toto” as violative of
the First Amendment. It is hard to imagine a different result would have been reached, if
the Arizona State Bar had instead promulgated a rule that shifted its advertising and
solicitation disciplinary investigations to the ABA and then restricted bar membership in
accordance with the ABA’s “independent” disciplinary decisions based on privately
promulgated ethical rules that ordinarily barred lawyer advertising and solicitation. After
all, if states cannot themselves engage in conduct that diminishes protected speech and
association, they should not gain constitutional immunity by deferring to private
processes that ordinarily result in the same thing. Indeed, this very point was recently
made by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In Center For Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, the law at issue prohibited
the dissemination of child pornography over the Internet and gave private ISPs
independent discretion over how to restrict access to child pornography.68 Pointing to
such independence, the government mounted a state action defense, claiming it could not
be held responsible under the First Amendment for how private ISPs chose to restrict
access to child pornography.69 The court rejected the government’s contention out-of-

67

433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Center For Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 649-50 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
69
Id. at 650-51 (observing “[d]efendant argues that this overblocking does not violate the First Amendment
because it resulted from decisions made by ISPs, not state actors. According to defendant, ISPs have
‘options for disabling access that would and will not block any, or as many, sites as Plaintiffs claim were
blocked in the past’ and the choice of which filtering method to use was ‘completely the decision of the
ISPs.’ The Court rejects this argument”).
68
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hand in light of evidence that existing technology could only block both protected and
unprotected speech.70
Like the technological limitations that had the practical effect of causing private
ISPs to censor protected speech in Pappert, the ABA’s accreditation decisions are
constrained by standards that ordinarily prohibit online JD programs.71 As in Pappert,
the government cannot fairly disclaim constitutional responsibility for the suppression of
protected speech and association by private parties when such suppression is the practical
result of the government’s own regulation.
Despite the foregoing arguments, states that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of
ABA-accredited schools might still attempt to disclaim constitutional responsibility for
media discrimination by contending that independent market mechanisms are responsible
for any devaluation of (and consequent reduction in) Internet speech and association; and
that bar admission rules, unlike regulations prohibiting the distribution of child
pornography, do not directly cause the diminishment of First Amendment activities. This
argument would be based on recent cases holding that the First Amendment is not
offended by regulations that make certain kinds of speech unprofitable through
independent market mechanisms.72 The operative principle of this line of precedent

70

Id.
See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
72
Wine And Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. State Of Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that for
financial disincentives to violate the First Amendment, “the government, not waning market demand” must
be “directly responsible for the financial disincentive to speak” and further holding “[s]tripped of rhetorical
flourishes, W & S's real complaint is that section 3--5--11(b)(1) will have the incidental effect of
suppressing or eliminating the market demand for the particular type of business advice that W & S offers
(that is, marketing and management strategies whose successful implementation requires the coordination
of business activities with those of other market players). That circumstance does not suffice to hoist the
red flag of constitutional breach: the First Amendment does not guarantee that speech will be profitable to
the speaker or desirable to its intended audience”); Storer Cable Communications v. Montgomery, 806 F.
Supp. 1518, 1562 (MD. Ala. 1992) (holding “[s]imply put, the ordinance does not prohibit Storer Cable
from transmitting whatever programming it wishes, and it does not prohibit the plaintiff programmers from
licensing whatever programming they wish to license to Storer Cable. It does not purport to dictate or
71
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seems to be that financial disincentives alone cannot violate the First Amendment unless
they are directly imposed by the government by way of outright taxation or forcedescrow requirements.73 Following this reasoning, a law that imposed a discriminatory tax
on online schools and their students might entail constitutionally problematic media
discrimination, but not a bar admission rule that absolutely prohibits online law school
graduates entry to the bar. In other words, the state could prohibit graduates of online JD
programs from earning a living and then dodge the First Amendment when the
educational market predictably reacts by generating substantially less protected Internet
speech and association than would otherwise be the case. Such reasoning, however,
disregards the well-established rule that “[w]hat the First Amendment precludes the
government from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from
accomplishing indirectly.”74
Generally, government action that creates financial disincentives to engage in
protected speech and association implicates the First Amendment. 75 In Simon &

regulate the contents of any cable programming, and it does not burden anyone for engaging in
constitutionally protected activity. While it does prohibit certain commercial practices and "associations"
which have been afforded little, if any, first amendment protection, the Plaintiffs nevertheless retain their
unimpeded freedom to communicate whatever it is they wish to communicate to the citizens of
Montgomery. If Storer Cable loses some of the programming it desires because its program suppliers
choose to leave the market rather than comply with a valid law, ‘the statute results,’ at most, ‘in an
infringement upon plaintiff's profits, not its First Amendment rights’”).
73
Wine And Spirits Retailers, Inc., 418 F.3d at 48.
74
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 78 (1990); see generally Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 362 (1976) (holding “[t]he denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government for the
purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly”); United States
v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 461-62, 468-70 (1991) (holding “[t]he honoraria ban
imposes the kind of burden that abridges speech under the First Amendment”) (citations omitted); Cappetto
v. Board Of Education, 526 F. Supp. 710, 715-16 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding “a course of conduct intended to
discourage and intimidate teachers from associating together” by changing job titles and work areas
violated the First Amendment”).
75
See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc., Petitioner v. Members of The New York State Crime Victims Board,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (holding “[t]he Son of Sam law is such a content-based statute. It singles out
income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed
only at works with a specified content. Whether the First Amendment ‘speaker’ is considered to be Henry
Hill, whose income the statute places in escrow because of the story he has told, or Simon & Schuster,

21

Schuster, Inc. v. Members of The New York State Crime Victims Board, the government
was rebuffed in its attempts to prohibit criminals from financially benefiting from the sale
of books about their crimes.76 Content-neutral honoraria bans for public employees have
met the same fate.77 In each case, the Court held that the First Amendment was violated
by regulations that created financial disincentives to engage in protected speech, and the
holdings did not turn on the particular regulatory mechanism used to achieve the
disincentive. There is no reason to depart from this general rule when a regulatory body
uses government power to distort a market in such a way that market mechanisms
produce the same financial disincentive. Permitting states to adopt regulations that dryup market demand for online schools would create a loophole in the First Amendment.
Defenders of states that exclusively recognize ABA accreditation might also
advance a “state action” defense to the proposed media discrimination theory based on
Blum v. Yaretsky.78 There, the Supreme Court held that a state agency was not
constitutionally responsible for patient transfer decisions in private nursing homes,
rejecting the argument that the agency’s adjustment of Medicaid benefits in response to
such decisions made the state complicit in the transfer decision as a joint actor.79 In
rejecting this argument, the Court observed that the transfer decisions were based on
which can publish books about crime with the assistance of only those criminals willing to forgo
remuneration for at least five years, the statute plainly imposes a financial disincentive only on speech of a
particular content”) (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)); see also
Transportation Alternatives, Inc. v. New York, 218 F. Supp. 2d 423, 441-42 (SD. NY. 2002) (holding
“section 2--10 violates the First Amendment by allowing the Parks Department to charge higher permit fees
because a for-profit company is underwriting or sponsoring the event”); United States Satellite
Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Robert Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (E.D. Calf. 1999) (holding “[l]ike
the Son of Sam law, the Boxing Act tax ‘singles out income derived from expressive activity for a burden
the state places on no other income,’ by creating ‘a financial disincentive’ to broadcast telecasts with a
particular content. Like the Son of Sam law, the Boxing Act therefore violates the First Amendment unless
it passes strict scrutiny”).
76
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116.
77
National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 461-62, 468-70.
78
457 U.S. 991 (1982).
79
Id. at 1006-07
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independent professional medical judgment that was not in any way influenced by the
agency or otherwise entangled with state coercive power.80
It might be tempting for some states to contend that charging them with media
discrimination under the proposed theory is no different than the failed attempt in Blum to
hold a state agency responsible for nursing home transfer decisions. They would likely
argue that an ABA accreditation restriction does not adopt the ABA’s anti-online
schooling accreditation standards, but only responds to the ABA’s independent
professional judgment in making accreditation decisions. This argument, however,
would disregard the Supreme Court’s pointed observation in Blum that only the nursing
home’s transfer procedures and decisions were being challenged, and not the agency’s
benefit adjustment procedures or decisions.81 By contrast, the proposed theory of media
discrimination challenges only the bar admission rule that recognizes the ABA as the
state’s exclusive accreditation agency, it does not challenge the ABA’s underlying
accreditation standards or decisions. This is not just clever posturing of the proposed
media discrimination theory; unlike the challenge mounted in Blum, the proposed theory
cannot be said even to originate with the ABA’s private action in a relevant sense.
In the sense of identifying the source of the alleged constitutional injury, the
Supreme Court observed that the theory in Blum originated with independent private
action and not state action.82 This is because the private patient transfer decisions in
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Id. at 1006-09.
Id. at 1005 (observing “[r]espondents, however, do not challenge the adjustment of benefits, but the
discharge or transfer of patients to lower levels of care without adequate notice or hearings. That the State
responds to such actions by adjusting benefits does not render it responsible for those actions. The
decisions about which respondents complain are made by physicians and nursing home administrators, all
of whom are concededly private parties. There is no suggestion that those decisions were influenced in any
degree by the State's obligation to adjust benefits in conformity with changes in the cost of medically
necessary care”).
82
Id. at 1003.
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Blum would have caused the complained-of injury (i.e., inappropriate transfer to a lower
standard of care) regardless of state action. By contrast, under the proposed media
discrimination theory, there would be no cognizable constitutional “injury” without state
action. After all, the proposed media discrimination theory arises from the contention
that restricting bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited schools diminishes Internet
speech and association. If the ABA were not established by law as the exclusive
accreditation agency for a given jurisdiction, its preferences regarding online schooling
would have no necessary effect on demand for Internet communication and association—
the impact of the ABA’s preferences would be left entirely to the decisions of individuals
in the educational market, which cannot be predicted, much less ascribed to state action.
In other words, the ABA’s discriminatory approach to Internet schooling, standing alone,
is not the basis of the proposed media discrimination theory. Only the governmental
decision to recognize the ABA as a state’s exclusive law school accreditation agency
necessarily reduces the usefulness of online schooling, which necessarily suppresses
market demand for online schooling, which, in turn, necessarily devalues and diminishes
Internet communication and association from what would otherwise be the case. In short,
although the decision to discriminate against the Internet originates with the ABA’s
private action, the injury underpinning the proposed media discrimination theory
originates with state action—unlike the theory rejected in Blum.
In sum, an admission rule that restricts bar eligibility to graduates of ABAaccredited schools discriminates against the Internet medium, devalues online educational
communication, reduces the amount of protected speech and association, and, thereby,
interferes with the liberty of circulation and academic freedom protected by the First
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Amendment—predictably reinforcing what scholars have described as uniformity and
elitism in academic content.83
Part 5: An admission rule that absolutely refuses graduates of online JD
programs from sitting for the state bars should invoke and fail heightened judicial
scrutiny under the First Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis in the recent case of Mothershed v.
Arizona suggests how courts should review bar admission rules that prohibit graduates of
online law schools from practicing law. 84 There, the Court of Appeals applied
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment to bar admission rules establishing pro
hac vice and general admission qualifications for licensure in the State of Arizona.85 It
did so based on the constitutional claims advanced by a resident attorney who was
licensed by an out-of-state jurisdiction.86 The attorney invoked overbreadth standing to
advance the claim that Arizona’s bar admission rules interfered with and chilled the First
Amendment right of Arizonans to consult with an out-of-state attorney.87 Although the
Court of Appeals sustained the constitutionality of the challenged admission rules as
being content neutral and narrowly tailored,88 it is significant that the court applied
intermediate scrutiny to what are commonly regarded as occupational regulations of the
legal profession. In doing so, Mothershed consciously followed established precedent
that has repeatedly upheld the right to hire and communicate with legal counsel as falling
under the free speech and association protections of the First Amendment.89 Other courts
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have similarly applied heightened First Amendment scrutiny to other regulations that
would otherwise seem to be occupational in nature.90
Nevertheless, despite a respectable pedigree, Mothershed’s application of First
Amendment scrutiny to an occupational regulation might appear to clash with the
principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Lowe v. S.E.C.91 There, citing a number of
earlier cases, Justice White seemingly observed in his concurrence that the First
Amendment is not implicated by generally applicable occupational regulations governing
“the personal nexus between professional and client,” such as between attorney and
client.92 But the Supreme Court’s prior and subsequent holdings, and indeed Justice
White’s own views, are considerably more nuanced.
Justice White acknowledged in Lowe, for example, that “[w]here the personal
nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be
exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he
is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation
of professional practice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of

regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public to
be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest”) (emphasis
added); United Mine Workers Of America v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)
(holding unconstitutional declaration that union was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by
employing a salaried lawyer, stating “[t]he First Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left
government free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed that
prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly as such. We have therefore repeatedly held that laws
which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were
enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or even because
the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil”) (emphasis added); Denius v.
Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 2000); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990)
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speaking or publishing as such.” 93 Bar admission rules, unlike ethical rules, fall into this
category in so far as they typically restrict access to the legal profession long before
client contact is made. Moreover, even Justice White conceded that in the case of
occupational regulations aimed at personal dealings between professionals and clients, “it
is possible that conditions the government might impose on entry into a profession would
in some cases themselves violate the First Amendment.”94 Again, this analysis indicates
that even if all bar admission rules do not implicate the First Amendment, some might.
In fact, as will be discussed below, the justification for applying heightened scrutiny to
bar admission rules is reinforced by Supreme Court precedent holding that the First
Amendment is implicated by occupational regulations that impede too much protected
speech and association.
A. Mothershed’s analysis makes sense because bar admission rules can impede
too much protected speech and association to be immune from First Amendment
scrutiny.
To determine whether occupational regulations with large impacts on expressive
and associational activities should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has used what amounts to a balancing test. In
Thomas v. Collins, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized First Amendment
heightened scrutiny to strike down a registration/disclosure requirement for union
organizers.95 Rejecting the government’s assertion that the requirement did not implicate
the First Amendment because it was only incidental to a comprehensive economic
regulatory regime for organized labor, the Court said:
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The idea is not sound therefore that the First Amendment's safeguards are
wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity. And it does not
resolve where the line shall be drawn in a particular case merely to urge,
as Texas does, that an organization for which the rights of free speech and
free assembly are claimed is one “engaged in business activities” or that
the individual who leads it in exercising these rights receives
compensation for doing so. Nor, on the other hand, is the answer given,
whether what is done is an exercise of those rights and the restriction a
forbidden impairment, by ignoring the organization's economic function,
because those interests of workingmen are involved or because they have
the general liberties of the citizen, as appellant would do. These
comparisons are at once too simple, too general, and too inaccurate to be
determinative. Where the line shall be placed in a particular application
rests, not on such generalities, but on the concrete clash of particular
interests and the community's relative evaluation both of them and of how
the one will be affected by the specific restriction, the other by its
absence.96
In essence, the Court engaged in a weighing of speech impacts versus non-speech
regulatory purposes in determining whether or not to characterize an occupational
regulation as implicating the First Amendment.
Similarly, in Riley v. Nat’l Federation of the Blind, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down licensure, contracting restrictions and disclosure requirements for
professional charitable solicitors—repeatedly rejecting the argument that comprehensive
non-speech, anti-fraud regulatory purposes were sufficient to render the speech impact of
such regimes immaterial under the First Amendment.97 The Court emphasized the
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regulation of professional charitable solicitors should be analyzed under the First
Amendment because of its effect in substantially reducing “the quantity of expression,”
further stating “[w[hether one views this as a restriction of the charities' ability to speak,
or a restriction of the professional fundraisers' ability to speak, the restriction is
undoubtedly one on speech, and cannot be countenanced here.”98
Taken together, prior to Mothershed, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that
occupational regulations implicate heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment where
the weight of speech and associational impacts swamp the weight of the regulatory
regime’s non-speech regulatory purposes.99 Although “liberty of circulation” doctrine
was not articulated in Thomas or Riley, the goal of ensuring structural protections exist
for the free circulation of ideas logically connects their holdings to the core of the First
Amendment.100
There is a natural progression under the First Amendment from Thomas and Riley
to Mothershed. The regulations in both Thomas and Riley can be seen as directly
analogous to the bar admission rules in Mothershed. After all, non-compliance with any
of these regulatory regimes effectively precluded work in a speech-oriented profession,
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which, in turn, precluded speech and association both by the affected professional and by
those the professional would otherwise represent—such as potential union members,
charities and clients. In short, the regulatory regime addressed in each case imposed what
was a commensurate prior restraint on protected speech and associational relationships.
Moreover, although the regulatory regimes in Thomas and Riley were justified as being
incidental to other “comprehensive” non-speech regulatory purposes, including the
prevention of fraud, these justifications were rejected by Supreme Court.101 It is hard to
imagine the non-speech regulatory purposes for the bar admission rules in Mothershed
are more weighty or central then those that were unable to save the regulatory regimes in
Thomas and Riley from First Amendment scrutiny.
In fact, Mothershed advances a more modest application of First Amendment
principles to a putative non-speech regulatory regime than what could have been
supported by a logical extension of Riley. In Riley, the Court’s First Amendment analysis
considered the speech impacts of the challenged regulations on both professional
charitable solicitors and the charities themselves—declaring, in effect, it did not matter
whose speech was impacted, all that mattered was that speech was being restricted.102 In
this respect, Riley would seem to provide support for the contention that attorneys have a
personal claim under the First Amendment when regulations significantly hamper their
ability to speak for others. After all, the speech-activities of professional charitable
fundraisers are very similar to those of attorneys in that both typically are paid a fee for
speaking on behalf of another, rather than advancing their own personal viewpoints.
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Riley also applied strict scrutiny.103 Mothershed, however, did not go that far. It only
analyzed the First Amendment rights of clients in the context of an attorney advancing a
client’s constitutional claim based on overbreadth standing—and it only applied
intermediate scrutiny.104 From this vantage point, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was
quite restrained in its constitutional analysis and sensitive to the unique concerns
addressed by the regulation of the legal profession.
Furthermore, Mothershed does not stand for the proposition that all bar admission
rules necessarily trigger First Amendment scrutiny. The title “Officer of the Court” was
not disregarded by the Court of Appeals as a mere platitude. The Court was cognizant
that the conduct of the legal profession is central to the governmental administration of
justice and warrants special regulatory consideration.105 Indeed, the practice of law is
significantly different from other occupations in that attorneys regularly wield the
coercive power of the State directly or indirectly through the initiation of lawsuits, the
service of subpoenas, and threats of legal action. Correspondingly, there are undoubtedly
weighty non-speech regulatory purposes behind some bar admission rules, against which
any speech impact might reasonably be viewed as incidental and unprotected by the First
Amendment. Even so, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was well-within the scope of
the principles laid down in Thomas and Riley when it applied intermediate scrutiny under
the First Amendment to bar admission rules that prohibited residents of Arizona from
consulting with attorneys who happen to be licensed by other jurisdictions. The
argument for such heightened scrutiny is at least as persuasive in the context of admission
rules that enforce media discrimination.
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B. Mothershed’s analysis warrants applying First Amendment scrutiny to
admission rules that absolutely restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABAaccredited law schools.
The “speech impact” of an admission rule that absolutely restricts bar eligibility to
graduates of ABA-accredited law schools is much broader than that of the bar admission
rules in Mothershed. Such a rule is not only a prior restraint on consultative relationships
(as in Mothershed), it devalues and diminishes educational Internet speech and
association by law schools, their professors and students for no other reason than that it
occurs online.106 In view of the growing body of evidence that online schooling meets or
exceeds the educational outcomes of “bricks and mortar” schooling,107 it is becoming
increasingly apparent that this distinct and discriminatory speech impact lacks any
significant countervailing non-speech regulatory purpose. Even more significantly,
where a given regulation poses a risk of media discrimination, the Supreme Court has
already observed that “laws that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for
special treatment ‘pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,’ and so are always
subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”108
Consequently, there is even greater reason to apply heightened First Amendment scrutiny
to an admission rule that restricts bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools than to the admission rules at issue in Mothershed. Moreover, the absolutism of
recognizing the ABA as the exclusive accreditation agency of the state tips the balance in
favor of deeming such a rule unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny, unlike the
rules that were upheld in Mothershed.
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C. The absolutism of establishing the ABA as the exclusive accreditation agency
of the State warrants deeming such an admission rule unconstitutional even under
intermediate scrutiny.
The bar admission rules upheld in Mothershed were deemed sufficiently narrowly
tailored to withstand intermediate scrutiny because they advanced a legitimate state
interest without significantly impacting speech and association unrelated to this
purpose.109 To support this holding, the Court observed, in part, that the rules did not
impose “a blanket prohibition on the appearance of out-of-state attorneys in Arizona
courts.”110 The same sort of observation cannot be made about a bar admission rule that
absolutely restricts bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools.
Even if aimed at the legitimate state interest of avoiding the expense of
individually evaluating the quality of every law school and the competency of every
graduate,111 an absolute restriction on bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited
schools has significant speech impacts that are completely unrelated to this purpose. Not
only does the rule restrict the consultative freedom of potential clients of both competent
and incompetent law school graduates, it devalues and diminishes educational Internet
speech and association for no other reason that it occurs online.112 The sweep of such an
admission rule is so broad that it can only be seen as a prophylactic speech regulation that
would fail even intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.113
In the final analysis, the real choice is not between evaluating the quality of every
law school and the competency of every graduate, or only evaluating the competency of
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graduates of ABA-accredited law schools; the real choice is between an absolutist
prophylactic admission rule or an admission rule that establishes ABA-accreditation as a
recognized signal of competency, but also allows for the possibility of waiver for
graduates of online JD degree programs in light of the ABA’s unfounded discrimination
against Internet schooling. Even under intermediate scrutiny, states that continue to
restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, without furnishing a
waiver process for graduates of online JD programs, should anticipate constitutional
litigation under the First Amendment, especially as recognition of the educational value
of the Internet continues to grow.
Conclusion
States that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools not
only punish graduates of online JD programs for daring to have engaged in online
educational communication, they necessarily devalue educational communication and
association over the Internet. This, in turn, predictably diminishes the amount of
protected Internet speech and association in favor of traditional face-to-face
communication and association.
Such media discrimination is vulnerable to First Amendment attack under theories
that seek to protect liberty of circulation, academic freedom and access to the legal
profession—the lifeblood of which is protected speech and association. Moreover,
because of over-breadth standing under the First Amendment, each of these theories can
be brought by any aggrieved graduate, student, law school or potential client.114
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In light of the foregoing, the ABA should be encouraged to continue working
towards developing accreditation standards that measure and certify academic quality
without sacrificing innovation to educational orthodoxy. But states must not wait for the
ABA’s standards to evolve; they should meet their constitutional obligations and furnish
graduates of online JD programs with an alternative pathway to licensure in the form of a
waiver process that takes into account objective demonstrations of competency, such as
legal experience and licensure by other state bars.115 In this way, the door to a profession
that is infused with the exercise of First Amendment rights will open to individuals for
whom the Internet is simply the best—and perhaps the only—educational medium.
Equally important, ordinary citizens will be able to enjoy their First Amendment rights
more effectively because they will have greater access to qualified legal counsel.
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